carus "e tures

I formon sense world- and ts metaphysics-

present events and scene -- prospective - anticipation, preparatory

, recollection, observation, N S april 13 repitition, recurrence, kinds, classes, sorts, things, events, what happens to things

things independent, separate, space, and time bounds, events, time limits, conjunction, aggregation and dividion, external change internal changes - self-moving, eternal, to its pppositevarities of spatial provinces, of temporal endurance, always, mostly rearely, prodigiously, marvellously oncely.

II The logic of descourse --

framed to meet the mat erial of common sense of course-- • nouns, common and personal, this, adjectives, adverbs &csubject-predicate, continuous, discourse, arguing-- thought-

Soc the anlysis by Plato and Aristotle-

identity of meaning --- the noun, or thing of common sense - what

happens to it when subjected to the laws of discourse as its meaning dominates, form Idea, a surprising addition to common sense norms of being-- universal- essence, classes, kindsand yet implicit in common sense dicourse, conversation, social intercom intelligibility its meaning- substance and subjectsit is meanings that are communicated not things, forms without matter- we <u>understand</u> not things but their meanings- things ire like terms-- their nature like a judgment or proposition- ther connections like consecutive discourse, hen well organized

identity, contradiction "c --

III The spiritual tradition, mean dont live by commonsense aloneimagination provoked desire and wonder--- goods, animism, the fatex, rule of life, connected with social control and functions religion, art, poetry, drama--- bsorption of "ewish, hritianroman administration--- in Xnty) "he net world viewIV -the irony of situation- medieve 1 world wholly intelligiblebut wholly misunderstood in detail and in principle--- modern, world an ithetical to intelligibility, but constant science-knowlege growing and fruitfully applying, but its possibility a problem- (or else start First lecture with this)

when men had no knowledge, they were sure of it and had no problem of knowledge, the more knowledge they got the more they wonder d how they could have any)

the limitations of the common sense know-- ma novelties, not coped with- or forced under-- sh rt curve of expectation inexact, precarious, N S April 13th.

science as answer

resulting epistemology the fundamental mistake carrying over the old conception that the world and knowledge equate one another- or that the world <u>is</u> what it is for knowledge- confused the standpoint of immediate enjoyment and use for knowledge--- esthetic and practical- teleology- taken as knowledge of reality--- hence inheritanceworld must be what <u>itxisxis science</u> reports it <u>as---</u> in reality, function of control, prediction,

kn

problem of perception and sensation .s epistemological everyday experience -conception vs perception ---

preserving the spiritual tradition, objective idealism, idealism via analysis of knowledge---

nind, consciousness and body interaction, paralleism, subjective idealism- santayana acdepted the self-individual- nd mind and the world-

general solution -- exp as esthetic and practical, that is enjoyment appreciation direct - and utility, things made for us to our hand -contrast of things as present and as changing, moving, future con equences and future presences --- the place of knowledge --culture the construction of the ideal tradition the construction of the cumulation of the rus Lec

problem of knowle ge-

measurement and value ---

value me sured, defined in exchange --- comparison-

science as a system of comaprisons

coordinates --

function of the loss of the things, values, in the process of measurement exchange--

the medium of exchange ---

but have to retain some intrinsic values-

some direct perce tions- which never lose themselves wholly in the me surement-system even tho all covered up- obstrude-

then Berkeleyan reaction- return to the simple direct lifeexcampe a confusion and a corruption, lose ourselves in getting something else to exchange for something else, and the only incre se is in the medium of exchange which only repeats the exchange-

consumption --- creative -- so science - must enrich perception and immediate use and enjoyment ---

IV IV Workshop-- teleology and mechanism--

I Provinces and Boundaries.

VI Yalue and its measurement--- appreciation and science--n III- Security and Admeture - S Maker V further Mattitude at home and abroad- heimweh and yearning for the beyond- famili r and strange- the loved and contempted- the feared and hoped forpossession, property, and savings and expenditure- peac and war-

memory and experiment --- evolution,

ses M

arus lectures-

attempt to abolish the locomotive by establishing an infinite no stations

heimweh- and the yearning for the beyondthe locale and xhm exploration, expansionextension, expansion and its reaction to diversify, intensify intensity though res riction, the held in springextension resisted gives intension-

nationalism otherwise run like molasses-society nd solitude, entering into the closet to pray- consuming your own smoke--

Hudson on the unity of mind, homogenity in a village--

the neighbor and the stranger --- habit and its breach -- function of war, commerce, travel, reading ---

the pireon hole and the attic, lumber- "austthe wind and the scattering of papers-- dis numbance--

separateness and conjunction ---

first we distinguish, individualize, then we deny distinction and find a law of relation that concels-

economy and freedom- Swift

savings nd excess expenditurethrift and new production-ac uisition and spending, creation, carting things about, changing from one pocket to anotheranabolism and katabolism-- build up to break down- st oring of energy-- Boundaries,

ate, to egulate, ate, to egulate, measurement- spatial determination of time relativity----

books and the author, capital and the capitalst, land and the land-

conventions--language, fies, deciet, communication, messages, telling the tunth-directions to pehaviorsocial situation--in megning of words-sympathetic interpretation and defining responsibility Genesis and validty, origins and ends, instrumental and final--

production and consumption --- matter and mind---

organization and reorganization --- the expert engineer,

structure and function--

Province-Leibniz a chage anywhere is a chage everywhere, a stone in the pool- but hardly the same to a frog and to Sirius, a tidal wave, distubrs the borders but hardly theremote inland, q aulitative limit, the conception of quality as agt quantity- Mechnaics- no leale, nor provinces; all the same everywhere, os importance no where. Reach a certain limit meets red stanc thrown back on itself-intensice change, extensive of extensive chemical cgange as well as physical- indifference an opposition which is specific- like reaching the border- the importanceof border surf-aces, ab are overlapping, may be of special tension or or relatively beutral homogenityorgans of body-surface and interior- significance-

misunderstandinger animosities trafiifs and wars, yet also meaning of home, maxx heath, native land, tradition, literature etc,

problem of adjustment solved only by interal organization- as true for atomsas for huma body adfor countries-

may be capable of statement in termsof aggregates and densities but it <u>is</u> something other.

movement within an area indifferent as long aswe rea h the point- tra velling on atrain, may look out window, or read or absorv in lunch basket we get there is the train does- cross the border, achage in quality skies language, food maners, chage our seas but not our minds not trueezzept for a physical being- and he may get indigestion or into a fight. math a universalized theory of boundaies, in which of course there are no boundaries because nothing to bound, nothing provinces

just homogenity- but infinity, zero, vectors remain to remind the wise, also <u>one</u> - free movement no movement at all-merely change of position which makes no difference since each position is equally a centre or circumference oranything else. metaphysically, a mechnical universal is one without provincesor boundaries a fixed teleological universe isoneofunchageable provinces- Cornford ethos, haunts, spatializing of the world with fixity of up and down back forth, irretrievably centred and bounded, finite. classes, ranksg rades,

Caras - Lectures. Not the day the of thum in the Boen - why his turonitie not, failed to be realized - The Ec. & natural Situction - his condemnation of atalante, & atataotics reverge. the machet-plue = middle man = mathequir science to aborphin of pud konsurbhin beary on matter maid --

Car. Lettes Introductor i tal remto pento phil minere ned afre aven a more invest Kopolenen arsin good tivil -Sperence - also - the carert the focks the axis, even when sc. Inpplies the content.

tature - our home. Give remake if. our walls when we make it. ancestry openting Cance reffect. The fits anials the cycle: - porpose - ends: Thatting mory-3 families the those TL

alkeney, he carry a charter

and to the sea

Fallen Margares

Conversation and Missender Condings Communication . The Forum the Temple 2 Boundanes and the Province's the tomate By Checkenge Asabstitutes & the the hel Place in the Country agrinalers the the the Place in the Country the Count Descent: Parchiged ancestors Afforing Worship-me: The Past -1 the Homehold. Skeletons in the Closet. 2. the Province. Skeleton & High Blood 3. Mallerhed Place He Roads. 4. Roads: Plan: The Letter whe Spint. 5. Jonen Henry \$3 Stations and the focomotione White . Motion & Time. Throrking The thop, -The Brighter The thop, The temple

Car L I

wo modes of approach, starting points and direction-

beginning with the humanly familiar and getting clues--- fruits the top and working down--- B Shaw, on learning bycicle and evolution-30 silly in his assumption that it creates a new tissue- phil significant in that a new level accomplishment, rearranges and thereby releases energy for new ends.

other the most definitely established kn- which will always be technical and remote- and working up - Dessartes- for example in his Rules--- colors as geometirical forms-(may be union of two and if they do not come together, we get dualism--- )

no basic preferability--- both legitimate and necessary-each has its characteristic danger-- that of starting with the complex familiar illustrated in B Shaws life force, will to live, vital force-a function which is complex and eventual hypostazied and then shoved back- lack of analysis- Schp -same with intelligence, reason-- then sobecomes abstract though a concretion.

Other hand, lack of synthesis, making too specific and narrow a onconception carry a burden too large- and as some other specific natural process comes to imp focus of science, is ignored and past over- the fortunes of Arist phil of nature as compared with his metaphysics, or ~eDescartes- extension and vortices as compared with his human end--maging focus of a stand in these lectures with the

eventual end--- experience, weakness of historic empiricism, started ith with some sc -alleged analytic result- not with a gross empirical concern-- also danger of conventionalism instead of genuine fresh experienc -68499957222558ASepijjj3AAynnjjddcooyy[[]uuuuuuuqqqqqqqq

weshifution of the sarth, or heavens

Carus L 2 narrowed down too much, exp as exlusively psychical or individual o day, begin with familar fact of boundaries which play such a mighty and perplexing part in contemporary life--- the outcome of the war--- look at the map--- our political and economic life determined or affected by boundaries--- pol determined, econ affected- a distinction to be borne in mind---

"imaginary" What is a boundary line--- ? Journey from wne side to other- find you elf under a different jurisdiction--- within a differently organized syst m of action----

1 The line is a nme for the limit of a jurisdiction which is dynamically determined--- a region, of energy-

2 continuity- no interregnum, or no man's land- where one **begin** leaves off the other begins-- you cant define a boundary in terms of <u>one</u>, you must have two regions of energy, two areas of activity that reciprocal ly limit each other... The xxnend of one is the beginning of the otherand which we take as the one or the other depends upon the one we identify ourselves with-- the other one is that which limits us, which exacts a chang of our wonted **Exercises** doings--- the selection is in a way arbitrary, but it the identification which requires the selection isnt arbitrary but unavoidable- Every man belongs somewhere, no man without a country---

and dist irregularly, spotted 4 The system of energy is centred and energy is distributed-- there is of Adullam a capital, a seat, and minor seats scattered about--- there are caves and cities of refuge, outlaws in a wilderness, butlying regions where the centred promisetion is weak weak weak weak in a persiden

weakazazaza organization is in operation--

## Carus L I. 3

Summing up

1 A Number of differently centered and arranged systems of energy

checking one another externally and modifying one another internally degree of organization due to external pressure, otherwise loose 2 Taking any one.

5

organization implies, arrangment, implies

a. a centre of orders---arrangments- laws but centred and distributed

b, minor centres, whose activities are part lyifurthered and party ii left unused, iii

left alone and partly checked by that of the organization or system

in which they fall- internal pressure toward disruption and modificat tion- expansion, and revolt, correlative---no limit, Individuals the obvious social limit but each individual is constructed on similar system- Leibniz "organic" without limit---

Geography and history ---

structure and process---Application to Explanation of some phil . problems and perplexities, becoming puzzle

paradoxes ---

2

1 the spatial construing of the world --- Zeno tensionpoints λL ALA ference organization explained in, terms universal Indl its Mornes al own terms, termini measures, systems of coordinates. the physical dualism- where are / ideas, errors. where 87 relati when of one γÛ 1 functions on other hand --orders, classes 3 mathematical philosophy

phase of the whole--- ? or should be a logic of subject and pred into a logic of relations-probably the latter.

<sup>v</sup>arus I, 4

or should it be a statement of natural existence in terms of logic, first of Aristotleian subjects and predicates, arranged by genera and species then of logic of relations, in which the non-hierarchical, the conflicts, streses and strains, are stated as a kind of logical relation, asymetric and non-transitive--- probably this----

arus, II, 1 . Not simply a scene of intera tions but of axwarkdxafx communications, which are interrupted and opaque, with resulting troubles, error, mistake, evils -- al best they have the ting trougles, error, mis and taken for also and the set of discussion, communication, persuasion, understanding, musicat argument, controversy, diplomatic exchanges, analyze-language--- terms, context, plurality, mustal exclusions i e repeats the prior analysis and interactions in its own structure, but also reduced to means of effecting agreement through mutual and reciprocal enlightenment. enrichment--the world a world of messages -- Pupin things the status of meanings-idealism reduces to mere vehicle of communication --- a tenderminded reading of the world----an idealized humanizing of the world- "acons complaint of Aristotleread dialectically -in trms of maximal understanding. comprehensiontheistica- a world of revelation, communication, or other way around of appropriation of a message, an idea Green--- the higher understand the wholly lower from the start, the lower either fails or else only a toilsome. partial process -- ancient, lower capable only of being understood, modern an probational and gradual, partial, frustrated process--what the other schools calls other hand, language only a subjective convenience- the media of communicasubstantively tion alone **angextively** real. A reading of matter must find in it the conditions of intercommunication as well as of obstructed comnot merely as extrnisic conditions, but as intrinsic --- tendency toward - evolution? that is, an interaction in which each in own internal structure comes to embody, thru interaction, the characteristics of the othersof which which it has carried on transactions --- habit, memory, tia internal modification preserving the new outcome of hts previous negoations universal trait of what we call matter --- also the king becomes more and more symbolic, or govt more and more the organization of means of communica tion, exchange ---

irus II 2

"ring in hare ? problem of error, misrepresentation, misconception, world promises but doesnt fulfil-

contracts which are onesided-- we are so implicated we cant escape, na ture slips out and laughs at us- we may learn, but we cant learn enoug to avoid similar mishaps- cant anticipate all future messages that require understanding, because we can understand only in terms wf what is recorded, modifications already undergone- the pathos of expectation-- the tragedy of defeat- how escaped-only by recalling the tentative character of the reading and keeping ip opmathe active processtaling learning rather than knowledge as our ideal-

much that cant be expressed in the current language in the individualnot even to himself can it become formal, articulate, the pathetic apreading peal for sympathy, for aid in understanding one self- Spinozas social phil-

other gets used to suppression thru wont, choked- but when freed is slangywild, romantic--- ejaculatory not grammaticalarus - 40 ? II- market place III ?

**meeting place**, not for discussion but for exchange market place-

trading, exchange of products- meeting place, neutral, ful contact the anthroplogical theory of origin of peace between severed clansovercoming strangeness, thru want's pressure. swapping direct, barter, man a truckling, higgling animal indirect, commerce, money--

accounting- reduction to units, quantity,

reckoning, calaculating ---

excess result, giving and taking, assim and excretions saving and function modify ebvironment past products, future uses- growth of risk or future with indirect uses or further exchange---

the growth of materialism- importance of matwrial not used save for exchange lording it over materials of use---

accounting for the universe-- elements and exchange---

calculation, supremacy of muantity---Spencer, Hobbes, a ding and substraction, system of substitutions- just as good, and for me better.

system of specializations- divisions, reaction into structure- habittools, machines, organs where extraorganic-become ends-- dominate-The analogy of physical science with system of exchanges---Ream Roland means and ends- the dualism, means as ends- quote sut or of ean Chritophe gation sometime an, 1922 - ends, termini as means- a moving world, no fixd ends- -the external and internal relations, external as mechanicalreal in nature but never the whole reality-- giving off and taking in the world is qualitative from starta phase of tranformation-

Garus L No.? 1 exhibitng relations and proportionswhole and parts, Workshop human beings engaged in transforming . reshpaing materials. with the help of tools, and using certain processes --also prior **ppuduts**s set the models, patterns, standards-plan- in the abstract, the formal arrangment-- blue-print or diagram the shoe as the end or purpose of the shoemaker, the house of the architect and builder, different from the **mkan man**xas aim. intentionpurpose or end or design as related only to human desire -or in the mind- only in the mind because in the world--- design as mental- image or Idea- merely a transfer of the real into the definite mind--made to order, a shoe for a man, a house for for a definite orderad concepts - form limiting term at each end-which are initialtransformation -- of materials but which are fit, apt, end, completion, perfection- equals being without gualification. movement- change . coming from without the particular material worked upon--also apt. fit. proper techniue, ordr of procedure- rule of steps, or operations--above is making as art or craft--cycle. closed--- recurrent--- at most improvement of details--ends- satisfy. static equilibrium- may not be well done. but ends are worthy, good, perfections, desire within the process of makingmay be sold, but acts are adapted to ends nonetheless as nor for something of a kind as yet unmade---- conception fo which renders us dissati fied with all existing ends---Plato's and Aristotle's analysis Modern factory or makery and of both from end divorce of end-product from making- the end is wages or profit- some body else's end--- unknown, uncertain, precarious. may prefer some one elses or style may change or he may not have money- statistical any one of:, or so many of an unspecified no just so wages may be spent here or there, for this or thatmay buyalso invention of tools, processes -- some new use, outcome-

#### Workshop 2

products- dualism of ends from materials and processes-

ends are personal aims and, when attained, personal satisfactionthe obje tive end rélegated to place of materials, something to be used still in some undetermined way....

objective becomes a mechanical. lifeless, soulless--

ends and goods become , teleological be come -- subjective, mental, psychical ---

qualities are part of extrinsic effects, called impressions,

sensations---

form become spatial, arrangement in space of ingredients, elements position, xxxxxix, mass-

motion a matter of space, xquantity and velocity-lcomotion which is least important become all important when we get the locomotive engine The m chanical point of view, impersonal, depersonalized, because deindividualized - quainty production, standardization of units and process esthe machine instead of craftsmanship---

the social problem ---

instrumental and final brought together again, but with marked changefluid, prospect of variation, uncertainty, risk, novelty,

dislocation, translocation, locomotion, the inventive subject --- and

his varying goods and efforts. expansion a constant factor ---

Individuality and expansion ---

Experience and Philosophical "ethod

2 Experience and the Rational - and Universals

3 Experiences and Selves- the me in experience

4 Experience and the Psychical- or "xperience and the Qualitative, the immediate..

5 5 Experience and Values

1

6 #xperience and Metaphysics.

Experience as evidence of existence- the first as written in the summerExperience as creterion and method-

I Difficulties , seasel word, meaning given, life, mxmm history, culture-in its anthr opological sense-

The question here is not verbal however . Ar - we to start philosophical inquiry from the material of **kixtery** physics on one hand and of psychology on the other, or from that matrix of life history in which the distinctions have grown up with a

view to discovering etc...

An ithesis of **xxxxhxixgy** world and man, in man of body and mind, in mind of unconscious and conscious- the mediate and n the immediate or sychical, thining experience down to immediate states. Hiller, etc. Not raising the question

here of the correctness of the reulst of the latter nor of am denying versal usage-xanix that exp in this sense is not a roimary datum n

nor acriterion and that there is something else, that human career in which 1 ving men have wrought and suffered and been something more than psychologists before they could even write

as problem later on , but here can The subjective and objective- history not subjective

except as subjects, persons, a peculair kind of being are them selves in the larger sense objects - law crimes torts, rights involves knives and guns, and houses and fire(arson and commodities, railways, bonds stocks - an additive factor not

an elimination or subtraction ---

### I exp as method

II- real and apparent-precarious and assured- risky, doubtful and certain
the ontological problem
III - objective and subjective-physic 1 and psychical
the epistemological problem
tertairy qualities, emations-- perceptions, &cthe self as mind---

the distinction as a reference, in the interests of control

IV-- <sup>4</sup>deal and real- v lues and existences

meaning, intercourse, communication, langu ge--

Mind, Reason in the eulogistic sense- main and the variable.

V

Mechanic 1 and teleogical- knowledge as teleology-- purpose meaning as regulative--- ancient, "antian-- source of order-

VI General metaphysical conclusions --

a critical radical empiricism as philos-nature of its hypotheses, a and confirmtations, tests-- synthesis how far possible,

genesis,

eventual-

the course, process-

-problematic elements- change of standards- e g education, science and philosophy- specualtive element- same with every great shifto of interest, point of view, evalution, totality, comprehensiveness as associated with phil as agt science-

the possibility of exp evolving its own guidance-- democracypermeation of insight, more blessed to give than to rec- but more blessed both to give and take-

- 2 comparison with experience -- the world, n ture but with instea of without persons, efforts, etc etc.,
  - some word to express this continuity, this added complication willing to surrender exp is a better word can be found...

II. Science, Art, Control, <sup>K</sup>eligion, a course, ualitatively diversisified, yet having common factors differently treatly, perspective phases in physics, no phase rulex 's yet for exp, but philos - emphases-- the idea of phases, a general theory of experiencing as \_ stuggling for --- conflict of interests- in their objective sense--

two objections, Woodbridge-- answer, xxixxxx knowledge-- cat and dog, first, and then knowledge, and element of thinking in anything called human experience-- thi. is significant factout no reason for reducing all the others to the thought dimensionan all incluive office or no assurance that thought has a supreme function- may be relative and require attention to other phases to be understoodobjective that experience as criterion commits us to

2 the absolute idealists - experience, telescoping, inst ead of the course, the rythm and conflicts --

Braldley Royce,

II. Experience and the rational empirical particular, not us reduction of experience to sensations. The particular, not us bychical the Greeks. Hobbess contrast with science --

dialectic itself empirical in the sense here used-essences, natures, sun istences-

the pecuilar function of reason in experience -- social commu nication ---

cosmic. sociation my systication diversion texperience --

Iv Experience and Immedicacy ---- consciousness, (ualitative transie cy and etc, mind and matter, id alism, realistic aversion, reduction to more vehicle--

V. "xperience and v alue value as a hybrid xaxia realm value tertiary u lities--VI--The metaphysical Experience as criterion and method --

some difficulties-

developabsolute experience, Bradley and Royce- does getting away from sensational empiricism- necessitate getting over to absolutestic- dilemma-

again, experince is observation, test--- place of emotion and appreciation, science-- assertions of matters of factmediate and immediate, is phil as science- tertiary ualities- leads us into metaphysics.

realistic, the prima facie situation-

a subject, a self, a mind, person, experience as subjective experience and consciousness, mental, psychical irrspective of mind-

James, radical nd pure experiencepanosychic ---

Carus lectures---

subjectivity, originality, deviation from custom, projection of new point of view, unpredictable, and at time unprovable, proof is ex paot fa to- but has a determining EXEXTERX effect- implies indeterminism in the situation , uncertainty, risky projection, identification with a probleminventors, in science- deviators--- a period when there is no definite art, no experienced contents or subject-matters from which generalizations can be derived, tules of action--

moral-in its own quality, rather than epistemological or 'mentalistic' save as this is used to define mental instead of having but has a metaphsyical aspect- implicates indeterminateness in situa tion

has a cosmic or objective effect- enters into the specific content of later situations- history of science--, Justice Holmes, branchings of the road, slight angular deviations, ending at very different places in future-

bearing on interactionism-

First face the situation more fully-

degrees of constancy and uniformity,

prediction and novelty, unpredictable, assured and doubtfulthings arouse expectations only to frustrate,

encody meaings only to disappear, leaving the memory a hope, a egretful memory,

error, mistake, the range of problem, doubtful if we have any adequate kn, save in meth and there we are not dealing with exist ence but with what older writers called relations of ideas and mode ern ones subssitences, rational but hypothetical objects, possible not actuals.

a terribly mixed world, love and hate, joy and sorrow, success vice and virtue and failre, flike garin and taresthey grow so interdependent that to uproot one distubs the other, not nealy marked off, but every one has the defects of his excellencies - his error is the obverse of some truth, touch up reality with imagination but even the wildest fantasy has some grain of definitve fact in it.

Th ink of these things s they occur, apart from interpretation in terms of a distinction between the real and the apparent, the infinite and finite, objective subjective, reaity and the experiencing of reality--

then is it not likely that the interpretation was made to order so as to get rid of the perplexities, an asylum refuge?

What can persons do in such a situation?

Esthetic recourse ---

2 Control --

1

Follow these courses ad forget why and how, and what is the result The ideal objects of contemplative aart -

the elements ad relations of knowledge

erected into the reality-

worl and the knowing mind, person that which is left over, which wont fat in , a world of seondary within the world or distributed between the or imperfect reality- contrasting-- may be taken cosmically or

#### "ectures

II- The personal and Me as swallowing, engorossing, their exclusionexp and my experience-

the experiencing process as an additive- an experiencedthe exaggeration of it modern idealism- the socallled realisite reactionplace of personal and subjective- bias, emotion, e ror, and so on in metaphysics-- - avoi ance of dualisms, paralleism, and miraculous interactionisms-

III--- Experincing as simplest method of realization the going-on charact of the experienced, and the abstraction involved in the cutting off of objects as past and merely present, and of the nontemporal- ourof a continuing process of change-

Universals, particulars,

the precarious, incomplete, alternative or ambiguous character of the world of existence-- apparently denied by knowledge-- rules, principles essences, laws- the modern hyper<sup>r</sup>latonism-- also facts, **EXXET** particulars fxitities, given complete, elements and relations, same rhing--

experincing- reference to shows the intrinsically precarious, ambigigous phase of the world- ---- the necessity of moderation

conflicts- Spencer on all law as having source in evil- adaptation, har mony-- fundamental problem of phil - the possibility of the the wrold as its functions in human experience or history evolving its own adequate of scheme of direction, guidance-- difficulty of problem- now are endlessly hampered in the dealing with bec use of distrust of the experincing sidehere lies the real value of the metho concept of experince-- since our deepest human problems are those of experience- war, taxes, laws, death and sickness- nationalism, railways, improvement of scientific methods of education, etc. a phil which passes grandly with a sweep over experience as irrelevant for its noble purposes is futile and wrong-- nothing it says as irrelevant for its noble purposes is futile and wrong-- nothing it says out the keyExperiencing--

--- weasel word. etc-

but means history, life, with its contens and achievements-- the war- cer tainly not merely in consciousness, or if it was, if that conclusion can if used objectively, not be derived from the fact that the war m may be called experience- prima facie experience is <u>of</u> whmewhats, to, for and by them, we dont experience just experience, mx much less experie nce just consciousness- all this follows from theories about experience not from the facts of reference to experience-

but if it covers the what, the objective usage- why not cut **xff** the word entirely, and stick to the wahts--

<sup>B</sup>ecause in so doing we ignerer therefore the clew to the important distinctions in <u>whats--in</u> the objective material- we tend to give one type af objects a value which doesn't belong and then to it-- to take it as a norm of the worth or even reality of others to read others in its terms, reduce others to ittwo fallacies-quote from S in L T objects of appreication, of affection-- of knowledge---

then also, the experiencing becomes an anomoly, a leftover, a superfuli or a miracle --- the personal and subjective-

In these lectures shall attempt to illustrate three aspects-- treating spearately the as will appear later they run inextricably into eone anothe

1 Definition of experience as knowledge- omission of other phases-

a - Greek, identification of knowledge with constemplation,

esthetic categories- hence fundamental mistake about <u>objects</u> of knowledge the diversion and arrest of natural knowledge

b--

mataterialistic mechanism or n turalism- externalism--

fa lure to see the peculairaites of objects of knowledge because of failure to **EXEXTRE** place the peculiar function of kn in relation to- appreciation, instrumental- practical character of know ledge- and at same time to call kn in its reflective, inte or logical phase instrumental is to make practical instrumental-- but not mere means- or external tool-- The problem of position, location, where- are illusions the importance of the field, grav, electricty, magnetism-

heat, motion, the discrete, mechanical-

illusion are a maladjustment in the field, bounded by organism and consequences nticipated and experienced-Locus, +Powell,

We are all ays within an area and concerned, interested in that, while it is interacting with others... the citizen, patriot,

problem of adjustment of percertion, a perception-field and imagina-.ion, con eption, reasoning s to what is beyond-

or will be- the element of dislocation- error-

physically speaking- the disruption of an area by something beyond its coundaries- breaking down without accomplished building up-

lag on one side --- preparatory or outreaching on other-

unhooked up movement- the tentacles moving about fo something seeking- organism ligs behind tentacle- f they kept time no mistake-

surface and central activities out of time-

where is it? Where shall activity centre- focus it- object and arm reaching, h nd clasping- a thing is there it is best handled--things that cant be handleded a molecule of gas- can handle the containthe volumeer- where is a moving arrow? can only locate within limits, so with an illusion, it is within a certain boundary--mind- an adjusting sytem for the central and the distantlife physically or existentially speaking mind is process of miking

a core and a periphery keep time- unstability and recovery-

Use and enjoyment are prior to anything save the most elementary and urgent prudence, just as prudence precedes the constructive thus arts, and arts the science. In all temperatem zones, the body is orna mented before it is clothed and habits of clothing beget the sense of erection and modesty. The embellishment of temples and palaces occur while homes are still hovels; Luxuries come before necessities except when necessities can be celebrated with **kkfmxsnd**xx feasts and festivals. Men enjoy a life of fishing and hunting and turn to the work of agriculture when sport languishes **xmd**x or slaves are at hand. Work is a temporary enforvement in a stretch of lessure and leisure means

facny and story-telling long before it signifies inquiry. Diffects the primarily touch and concern us, and only hard discipline after misfortune of missing them leads is to think of them as effects or indecessment texlook for examesized conditions. As long as fruits exist they are given; they are gratuities not results of a process of growth. Qualities and uses are close to us, and only when they fail us do we seek effects causes, which are always distant. And since seeking is troublesome we take the nearest thing that will serve as cause.

In short, reflection does not occur till enjoyment is threatened. And when it occurs it has to begin with what is in reality an effect, a temporary focus of a kang series of conditions reaching out to distant places nd remote times. Starting as it does from what is given, at hand, it sets out from what is most precarious and transient, and works slowly back to what is fundemental and secure. Things of sense and use are notable and if kkey only stayed, or

if only we could pass with certain ease from one satisfaction to another we should never **XANKXINEXALYTHING**XERX conceive of something else as more sufficient and noteworthy. This predicament explains must be problem of knowledge, that is, why knowledge, truth and the real object **XANK** problem<sup>S</sup>torsexagest wholes solution is sought, portions of the problem of evil.

It was early the habit to call by the name of experience all the grady qualities which graxaloss being close and intimate are used and enjoyment, and since all knowing and stenuous effort is a search for something beyond to conceave of truth and morality as somewhere over the edge of experience. Hence the philosophers habit of in thinking of experience as an effect or appearance of something beyond experience, and , once reflection is awakened, of attaching themselves unreservedly to this beyond. Greek philosophy began in wonder and admit ended in admiration , and so could easily think of experience as a transparent veil through which the realities beautifully shone to terminate in mestery in order through. But modern philosophy began not in wonder but in doubt, and so has either despised experience as an appearance which disguises and obstructs vision of causes, realities, or else has returned to cling desperately to than what is given, to ana impressions and appearances as the only continues ax sure possessions.

But after all the area of experience in the sense of what is quite immediately at hand is wider and richer than either ancient or mod rn philosophers have been willing to admit in the strain of their search for principles, reasons, causes, explanations. It includes something more than consolidated customs as the Greeks thought, or sensations as they moderns have supposed. We have even developed a technique for enjoying and using, for making as if present, the absent the remote, the beyond, and so experience daily includes things once outside it. And after all experience is but a name, limit experience as we will, for what is closest and most immediately noted and notable, and that from which we must, whether we will or not, set out in any is **xeex** quest for causes, for the underlying, for understanding. And if there be anything in the enterpirse of modern science, it is that to which we must bring back the spoils of our search is we are to discriminate imagination from insight. gancy from grasp.

in human life, more homely considerations than those associated with such traditional philosophic names as meaning, purpose, thought, we call metaphysics may take us more unerringly to that hypothesis bout the larger constitution of the unknown beyond. And the familiar fact of human history to which 4 would call attention today is that of the existence of areas and boundaries? For there is no phase of experience more persistent and unescapable than just this af one of bounded fields of action, enjoyment and suffering.Modern science has made us familiar with the notion that the consequences of every event are boundless. The pebble thrown in the water not only ripples the water to the banks but its disturbances extend in decre sing intensity to the uttermost bounds of the solar system, yes, and beyond. Yet for experience, for history, it is more significant that up to a certain point thexistensity safe, "nten-

sity and XXXXX limited range are, in short, ora ctically more important than XXXX indefinite extensity. To the frog whom is hit by the stone it gives intervent is speed. go in the source of the shore is the wave about them is has a significance that continuing slight tremors on the earth cannot volaanic eruption have, just as a tidal wave has that enables from or an XXXXXXXXX that covers a Pompeii has x vital significance for the inhabitants, which while to those far inland the events merely cause a momentary shudder hrough the medium of the XXXXX momenings of the support.

My suggestion is that for out general conception of the world, for our metaphysics specific fields and its boundaries are itation significant than the bare fact of unbounded extension. The limits of the field of observation is a commonplace. The horizon and a vault bound it; within that field diversified things present themslves, each one sharply or lossely marked off from others, and within it characteristic events occur each hacing for observation its own peculiar identity, even when shading into other events. The tenden-

# delimitations

to dispose of these **MATIXITY by** reference to the limitations of sense-organs and locomotion may not unfairly be called a mere trick. We do not get rid of specifically bounded areas by referring to another a kind of **MATIXATERXX** restricted province as **MARIX** cause. A seemingly more profound method of disposal is to refer piously to the **MINIMATINEX** finitude of the human mind, thereby implying that apart from our finitude the actual scene is one of undifferentiated continuity. Such a bunching of problems under the name of one **MAXIMIN** source may be convenient as a method of postponing the issue, but it only **MARIXEN** postpones. Why should a single unbounded stretch of universe suddenly turn up in **MARIM** finite forms of centred life? And if we stick to our premiss of some kind

of inginal metaphysical metaphysical continuity (as distinct from spatial and m thematic l continuity) the finitude of the capacity of apprehension ould mins seem to supply good reason for believing that similar finitudes spot maximum the universe no matter how infinitate it be as universe; it suggests therefore, that immediate infinitude may be only a name for the metaphysical continuity of finite provinces.

Look at a map or globe. Everywhere we find countries, peoples, with boundaries vague or exact. Pelect one of the countries mark d off by its special color for further examination. We find the process repeats itself. Within the country are provinces, within the provinces are are countwithin the individual cells. ies, towns, wards or parishes; within the 1 tter individuals. We seem to be facing an indefinite series of fields, each with its own boundaries. Everywhere we look we find clusters, constellations, nuckei, spheres of influence, ranges of effectiveness, bunchings, specifications. The scientist who has formed his metaphysics on **the** what hetskes to be the model of mechanics is likely when he becomes metaphysicall vocal to assert either a homogenous world in which differences are only subjective or else a world of mere points and moments equally homogenous. But in his scientific procedure he begins "by markanting out a certain region or subject as the field

field of investigations, and to which attention is confined"\* 4f he asserts \*Clerk Maxwell ,Matter and Motion, p.11

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7. 38 1

that the demarcation is a mere convenience for experiment and calculation he has to admit that the place and manner of maxingxinex drawing the line different is what maximizerizes makes the difference in the efficiency of scientific undertakings. he has also to face the mix difficult question of how results reached from an arbitrary selection can be safely predicated of the world. Were he not controlled by an artificial metaphysical preference, he would find it simpler to admit that he strives to follow the clew of systems, regions, fields marked off in nature itself.

The latter remarks are meant to inticipate guestion. Who, it may be asked, doubts or denies the common place f cts which have been a duced? Why expatite upon a truism? And the answer is that an experimentation metaphysics of popular science denies it. The popular doctrine of the epistemological subjectivity of colors and sounds, of pains and mutian affections, denies it. Every theory which attributes tax greater metaphysreality ical xaxixity to mathematical relations than to qualitative diversities denies it. Another rely is that systems like that of Spinoza deny it. To be sure he admits into his system individual or finite things. Jut the admission is furely formal . They are all them "in" unother and known through another. When they xxx are truly known, they isappear in the whole. Or stated in a less \_btract formal matter, it is not their difference from one another which is significant, but their difference from the whole as thig their substance. As comp red with their distinction their difference from one another is trivial, meaningless. A genuine doctrine of tamaxated countries and boundaries finds their distinction from one another the significant thing. In Spinozistic language, each has its own essence and is"in"itself.

The similarity of mechanistic and Spinozistic metaphysics is perh ps not surprising since ach derives from the same "artesian source.

В

It is more instructive to find professedly idealistic systems tending in the same direction, ax terminating in the same absorption of diverse areas in one after all all comprehensive field which is not a field because it is maximum infin-

ite. Since the function of judgment nd knowledge is to relate, to synthesize, to unify, it cannot end until all demarcations are swillowed in one complete whole in which interconnections rather than diversities have the last word. Or, stated in cosmological terms, we have the axiom of Lotze to which "ames was fond of referring- that separate things cannot interact, and since interaction exists, there are no separate things.

If I refer to these philosophies it is not simply to indicate that all monistic philosophies, whether mechanical or ideal in name, refuse to follow the clew of experience in exemplifying an infinite diversity of xamax bounded areas. It is also for the sake of suggesting why they do so. The metaphysics of knowledge will concern us later. But here we can say that any metaphysics which takes its clew from knowledge, or which holds that knowledge is to be defined in the t rms that knowledge supplies, is bound to end without in homogeneity, either that of logical form, or of continuous space and energy or of points and moments. For there is one form of metaphysical pluralism which is only a reversed monism at simply waterx asserts instead of the one One an infinity of ones, each as internally and ext rnally undifferentiated as is the One of monism.

Xxx The real issue is thus not between the Monism and Pluralism conceptually defined. It is as to the nature of the many fields with their boundaries. Let us return to our starting point in experience, taking as our empirical exemplar the existence of countries. What constitutes its region area and determines its bound ries? Clearly, the **XxxXx** in question is not one because of spatial or mathematical **XXXXX** or logical traits. It is one distinctive region so far as it behaves as one, and its limits are the limits of its effective behavior. - It is one in virtue of dynam-

rnal ∧ cohesion and resistance to external pre sures. Within the area. you are under one juridisction, one system of adminstration and laws, set of coercions. Pasaxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Withia a boundary, you may one travel freely as long as you observe a certain allegiance dynamically asserted. Lass over the boundary, and you have to show your passport. submit to customs' examination, pay a tariff, yield a different allegiance to different forces. Language and customs may change; authority, jurisdiction is certain to."Idealists are fond of referring to states as illustrations of their principle of an ideal unity which binds pervasively physical separateness into a whole. Well and good, but it is again a mere trick to identify 'ideal' with logical or rational unity, The if we have already unity is ideal only as WE determine the natural in spatial ed static terms. In reality, the **distinguises** demarcative unity is that of action, of co-action and co-ercion. It is sideal as the unitary movement of a unitary ball swirling through space at the impact of the club of a batter, and constituting his 'base-hit' or his 'out'. It is ideal if the commensality of a host and its parasites are ideal, or if the unity of an ecological territory be own ideal. Knowledge may not this dynamic unity or it may not. But it is there and asserts itself. Judgment may say that the unity of action is too weak to survive stress of external pressure, and as judgment is then out correct or mistaken, war may extinguish or solidify the state. Citizens within the state may be a are of the unity in all sorts of varying degrees or may even peacefully go their ways ignoring it. Their knowledge and interaction thought of it may intensify the unity and adding to its dynamic falls force. 3ut in my case, the knowledge Is within the AyaxMicxMMityx field of ction, the sphere of effective influence for dial is but te isxx the unity; The may reconstruct the never dov not create constitutes X

the unity of behavior which constitutes the anxxettermer a field or substance or country is inclusive but it is not homogenous. It is not composed of elements which are just like itself or like one another. A state is composed of cities and **xamatrixx** rural of citizens, men, women and children. districts; no forests, mimes and farming lands, No two towns duplic te one another, nor twax any two firms, nor any two persons. We cannot compound the st te out of homogeneous units. "ach of these constitujust formal ents is like the whole in one respect- it too is a unity of a mak complex behavior-system, with each of its constituents similarly constituted. The minor unities form the larger one not as bricks form the wall, by aggregation, but by interaction and co-mation. legal and adminstrative Laws Ainstitutions express the manner of the interaction. But they Go not originate it. They only formulate it. The formulation is itself dynamic. It reacts to modify the primary arrangment of activities it re which it expresses; it equalizes, tempers, distributes Apre sures and strains. This re-directive function is important; we shall meet it again when we come to the metaphysics of knowledge. But it is enstates secondary, not original. Law states, but it neither xxxxxxx nor any primary sense governs. Tuding and persive habits of govern duother main feature requires notice. A country is centred; there is a capital or chief treax town, a dominant seat or locus in of power of energy. Pure homogenity in diffusion is unknown. Provinces have minor centres, and counties their county seats, and villages their headmen and bosses. "hen we compare different countries we find all degrees of centralization and distinuions dis ribution of powers. This viri tion is doubtless significant for metaphysics; it sugthat refuse co g sts the various degrees of cohesion and organization which na ture emplifies: Marxitxiaxmaxexxignificantx Even the most orderly st te his its caves of gallin, its places of refuge, its haunts of synergetic action b ndits. There are regions where there are regions where In

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like fashion. Journaries are much bronder and vaguer in some political respects than in other. Legal and jurisdiction shifts abruptly at a line; a man may be free to sell liquor at one end of a house and forbidden at another. Butin language and manners even where the system as x whole xx quite distinct one is likely to find interm diate zones that shade off. extending vaguely beyond the political boundary on both sides. But such considerations do not negate the general conception of characteristic a manipedxregion of energies or behavior having a tightly or loosely distinctive marked axatus xuax boundaries and a centre. Even in mechanical descripmass-system tions of a zanfigared masseringmatian we cannot dispense with the concepts of configuration and centre.

As has already been intimited, the primary philosophical **tract**xx bearing of this clew from experience **XXXXX**rrx is upon the metaphysics of monism and pluralism. But it does not lead us far to say that it obviously points in the direction of pluralism. and in infinite pluralism, rather than a numbered -lurality. Xax Even more important is the kind of pluralism to which it brings us. For it carries us to a dynamic pluralism, a pluralism of behaviors. . of centres and spheres of influence. It suggests that being is doing. The formulation of this sugshape of saying gestion is likely to take the farm that what thing is what it does. Sixk Such a formulation takes provokes an easy retort, a retort effective against the form of the statement. How c n there be an "it" which does things unless there is being independent of doing? logically prior doing and to it, having a nature or essence which is expressed or manifest in it? daings?xx There is no answer to this question except to give up the "it form of and revise the statement. The centred area of activity is it; the equally to be located and defined in terms centre and the boundaries have of the character and scope of begavior.

\* The reasons for our tendency to personify, to .ttribute activity to a thing or substance which does or manifiest energy, which will concern us later.

No great value attaches to this statement taken as 🖲 conclusion. notable It has one maximum utility. It advises us that a genuinely empirical philosophy must terminate in a pluralistic metaphysics. But this concetion is so inevitable that its chief worth is to supply us with a starting point for further inquiries. Its application is lies its sigdynamic nificance. the primary topic for applying the experience of regions and boundaries is that of space. If we follow the model of experience in human life and history, we are forced to the conclusion that space. territoty, is a quality of synergetic activities. The country, la patrie, the with its centre and limits fatherland is not ximply just a space occupied by certain modes of connected behavior which can be conceived independently of it. It desigor registers nates and me sures the quality and intensity of that behavior. "xtension is the voluminousness of energy. Marrayx the latter has anapexandx vastness in precisely the same manner in which has any other Fuality. Activity is roomy just as it is temperatural or magnetic or luminiferous. · or economic or legal. Extensity is used to measure the intensity. But it can be used so safely by us for that purpose only because in itself it along muality with intensity. MILoreover, extension, stretch, is a comincident a muchness of spread.xxx is itself ualitatively diversified. A region. **xxx** such as m country, is not as we have noted internally homogenous. It consists of a multitude of activities which co-act and have a certhe quality of tain consensus of mutually reinforcing influences. Consequently vastness or voluminousness repeats itself in a multitude of sistinctive voluminousnesses within itself, each ualititaively istinct from one another from the total spread. This intrinsic qualitative diversity affords. and of course, the basis for location and position. It constitutes what psychologists have called the system of local signs, save that psychologists following the introspective tradition have too frequently regarded these local signs as miraculously resident in the mind or organism whence they

are miraculously ejected into things. Such a theory requires a third mir-

acle in order to work. Without some pre-ordained harmony of mind and the world the subjective system of local signs would not dit appropriately upon the scheme of things and aid in locating things, or assigning each its position in respect to mothers. Thus the culminating row of obsurdities serves an intellectual end. It warns of what happens when we deny or ignore the fact that spatiality with intrinsic diversification is direct quality of energies.

opular metaphysics of space has, however, reached an opposed conclusion. It conceives of space as an independent, static homogeneous entity which is merely occupied or filled by things and which merely gives energies a

chance to display themselves in. What account for this difference? Partly of course the emphasis of modern science upon measurement, and the fact that for purposes of measurement it establishes a system of coordinatesa matter which will occupy us later. But why should the system of coordinates have been taken for something more than it was? Why should Newton have erected initax a schemexsix technique of measurement into a thing-in-itself and found so many followers? The cause lies, I imagine. in certain features of ordinary experience. When we look at things we s e xtattigxx things which are chiefly static and see a still more static emptiness between them which both separates and connects them. Then our **EXEXCISES** earliest experience of locomotion and transportation teaches us that we may move gross static things in such ways that we leave a homogenous hole pehind while filling up some other hole. Later discoveries inform us to be sure that the blanks are not so emptied as they seem, but that some at least are filled with that complex of energies known as air and all possibly possibly by **xkat**x a form of energy called the ether. We also learn that translocation sets up different system of stresses and strains, and involes a redistribution of energies. But we accommodate our metaphysics to the historical order of our discoveries. Because the latter have occurred in a certain order, we go on thinking of a prior independent space whose sole quality is xx its independent extension,

and which is then subsequently filled by things **\*Kish** may be moved about in it **sy** without any qualitative alteration.

that

The instance suggests that a bare mg or bstract philosophy of exfor metaphysics perience does not suffice. It makes an enormous difference from what experiences we set out. It has been, I venture to think, great calamity for emparical philosophy that it has so usually set out from casual and fragmentary exp riences instead of from vital empirical situations. The rxtrationyax identification with of experience with sensory qualities, their associations and images, is of course one striking example of this unfortunate procedure. So is the whole tendency to substitute a psychological analysis of experienced based on an introspective method for ctual experience. But the vice and its evil consequences are xx Aristotle exemplified in less extreme cases. eginning with xxxxx xxxxxtxx experience has been a sociated exclusively with perception, having contact as it base and vision as its climax, and xxxxtixx with perception viewed as a form of manaxiaxx cognition not as a form of energy or behavior.

### as vital experience

Now perception is something more than contact with ready-made things or a beholding of them with the consequences of revealing their properties. Perception as experience includes interest, purpose and consequences and also the conditions which effect it. Any clew to metaphysics which confines itself to things and properties revealed and which ignores purpose, conditions and condequences is bound to give wrong results because it sets out from a mutil ted fragment of experience.